Overview of Constitutional Challenges to NSA Collection Activities and Recent Developments by Liu, Edward C. et al.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Federal Publications Key Workplace Documents 
4-1-2014 
Overview of Constitutional Challenges to NSA Collection Activities 
and Recent Developments 
Edward C. Liu 
Congressional Research Service 
Andrew Nolan 
Congressional Research Service 
Richard M. Thompson II 
Congressional Research Service 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Key Workplace Documents at DigitalCommons@ILR. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Federal Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. 
For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Overview of Constitutional Challenges to NSA Collection Activities and Recent 
Developments 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Beginning in the summer of 2013, media reports of foreign intelligence activities conducted by 
the National Security Agency (NSA) have been published and are apparently based on unauthorized 
disclosures of classified information by Edward Snowden, a former NSA contractor. The reports have 
focused on two main NSA collection activities conducted under the auspices of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. The first is the bulk collection of telephony metadata for domestic and 
international telephone calls. The second involves the interception of Internet-based communications and 
is targeted at foreigners who are not within the United States, but may also inadvertently acquire the 
communications of U.S. persons. 
As the public’s awareness of these programs has grown, Members of Congress and the public have 
increasingly voiced concerns about the constitutionality of these programs. This report provides a 
description of these two programs and the various constitutional challenges that have arisen in judicial 
forums with respect to each. Although a brief overview of the constitutional arguments and issues raised 
in the assorted cases is included, a detailed analysis or evaluation of those arguments is beyond the 
scope of this report. 
Keywords 
National Security Agency, NSA, metadata collection, constitutional challenges, internet communications 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Liu, E. C., Nolan, A., & Thompson, R. M., II. (2014). Overview of constitutional challenges to NSA collection 
activities and recent developments. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/1255 
  
Overview of Constitutional Challenges 
to NSA Collection Activities and 
Recent Developments 
Edward C. Liu 
Legislative Attorney 
Andrew Nolan 
Legislative Attorney 
Richard M. Thompson II 
Legislative Attorney 
April 1, 2014 
Congressional Research Service 
7-5700 
www.crs.gov 
R43459 
Overview of Constitutional Challenges to NSA Collection Activities 
 
Congressional Research Service 
Summary 
Beginning in the summer of 2013, media reports of foreign intelligence activities conducted by 
the National Security Agency (NSA) have been widely published. The reports have focused on 
two main NSA collection activities approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC) established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. The first is 
the bulk collection of telephony metadata for domestic and international telephone calls. The 
second involves the interception of Internet-based communications and is targeted at foreigners 
who are not within the United States, but may also inadvertently acquire the communications of 
U.S. persons. As public awareness of these programs grew, questions about the constitutionality 
of these programs were increasingly raised by Members of Congress and others. This report 
provides a brief overview of these two programs and the various constitutional challenges that 
have arisen in judicial forums with respect to each.  
A handful of federal courts have addressed the Fourth Amendment issues raised by the NSA 
telephony metadata program. FISC opinions declassified in the wake of the public’s awareness of 
the NSA telephony metadata program have found that the program does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. Similarly, in ACLU v. Clapper, the federal District Court for the Southern District of 
New York held that a constitutional challenge to the telephony metadata program was not likely 
to be successful on the merits. However, in Klayman v. Obama, the federal District Court for the 
District of the District of Columbia disagreed and held that there is a significant likelihood that a 
challenge to the constitutionality of the NSA telephony metadata program would be successful.  
Constitutional challenges to the NSA’s acquisition of Internet communications of overseas targets 
under FISA have arisen in a number of different contexts. First, such challenges have arisen in 
both the FISC and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review as part of those courts’ 
roles in approving the parameters of these collection activities. Secondly, constitutional 
challenges have been brought in traditional federal courts as civil actions by plaintiffs asserting an 
injury or in criminal proceedings by defendants who have been notified that evidence against 
them was obtained or derived from collection under Section 702. While the FISA courts have at 
times curbed the government’s ability to engage in surveillance activity to ensure compliance 
with the Fourth Amendment, other federal courts have not yet reached the merits of any 
constitutional challenges to these collection activities. 
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eginning in the summer of 2013, media reports of foreign intelligence activities conducted 
by the National Security Agency (NSA) have been published and are apparently based on 
unauthorized disclosures of classified information by Edward Snowden, a former NSA 
contractor. The reports have focused on two main NSA collection activities conducted under the 
auspices of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.1 The first is the bulk 
collection of telephony metadata for domestic and international telephone calls. The second 
involves the interception of Internet-based communications and is targeted at foreigners who are 
not within the United States, but may also inadvertently acquire the communications of U.S. 
persons. 
As the public’s awareness of these programs has grown, Members of Congress and the public 
have increasingly voiced concerns about the constitutionality of these programs.2 This report 
provides a description of these two programs and the various constitutional challenges that have 
arisen in judicial forums with respect to each. Although a brief overview of the constitutional 
arguments and issues raised in the assorted cases is included, a detailed analysis or evaluation of 
those arguments is beyond the scope of this report.  
Summary of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978 
As both programs make use of authorities provided under FISA, this section provides a brief 
description of that statute to help inform the subsequent discussion. FISA currently provides 
procedures for the approval of various types of investigative methods: (1) electronic 
surveillance,3 (2) physical searches,4 (3) pen register/trap and trace surveillance,5 and (4) the use 
of orders compelling the production of tangible things.6 The FISA Amendments Act (FAA) of 
2008 added additional provisions for the foreign intelligence targeting of non-U.S. persons 
reasonably believed to be abroad7 and the targeting of U.S. persons reasonably believed to be 
located abroad.8 Although the requirements for each category of investigative tool differ 
significantly from one another, all make use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC), a specialized Article III court established under FISA to review and approve 
                                                 
1 50 U.S.C. §1801 et seq. 
2 See, e.g., Senators Ron Wyden, Mark Udall, Martin Heinrich, End the N.S.A. Dragnet, Now, N.Y. TIMES, November 
25, 2013; PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted 
under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, at 
103-104 (January 23, 2014) available at http://www.pclob.gov [hereinafter “PCLOB Report”]; PRIVACY AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, Public Hearing Regarding the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (March 19, 2014). 
3 50 U.S.C. §1803(a). 
4 Id. §1822(c). 
5 Id. §1842(a)(1). A pen register is a device which records all outgoing numbers dialed from a particular telephone line. 
A trap and trace device is akin to a “caller-ID” feature that records the telephone numbers from which incoming calls 
are being dialed. 
6 Id. §1861(b)(1). 
7 Id. §1881a. 
8 Id. §§1881b(a), 1881c(a). U.S. persons are defined in FISA to include U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents, as 
well as unincorporated associations comprised of a substantial number of U.S. persons and most domestically chartered 
corporations. 50 U.S.C. §1801(i). 
B 
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governmental applications seeking to use one of the aforementioned authorities.9 FISA also 
establishes a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) to provide appellate 
review of decisions made by the FISC.10 
Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata Under 
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the National Security Agency (NSA) began 
a program in which domestic telephony metadata was collected with the goal of helping to detect 
and identify individuals who were part of terrorist networks.11 This program is frequently 
described as collecting telephony metadata “in bulk” to distinguish it from the narrower 
collection of metadata pertaining to an identified individual or group of individuals that is 
commonplace in both law enforcement and national security investigations. Since 2006,12 the 
collection of telephony metadata in bulk has been sanctioned by orders of the FISC issued 
pursuant to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.13 Under Section 215, the FBI may 
apply to the FISC for an order compelling a person to produce “any tangible thing” if there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the things sought are “relevant” to an authorized foreign 
intelligence, international terrorism, or counter-espionage investigation.14 An “authorized 
investigation” must be conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under 
Executive Order 12333 and may not be conducted of a United States person solely upon the basis 
of activities protected by the First Amendment.15 
Shortly after specific details about the NSA telephony metadata program were published in the 
media beginning in the summer of 2013, concerns about its constitutionality were quickly raised 
                                                 
9 50 U.S.C. §1803(a)(1). The FISC is composed of 11 district court judges selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court.  
10 50 U.S.C. §1803(b). 
11 Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency, Schubert v. Obama, No. 07-cv-0693-JSW 
at ¶ 32 (N.D. Cal. December 20, 2013) available at http://icontherecord.tumblr.com. 
12 Id. at ¶ 21.  
13 P.L. 107-56, §215, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §1861. Section 215 replaced an existing FISA provision that 
contained a mechanism for the government to compel the production of records from only four types of businesses: (1) 
common carriers, (2) public accommodation facilities, (3) storage facilities, and (4) vehicle rental facilities. A court 
order compelling the production of these records was authorized if the FBI presented the FISC with “specific and 
articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power.” 50 U.S.C. §1862 (2001). Originally subject to sunset on December 31, 2005, §215 has been 
reauthorized six times since it was originally enacted, and is currently set to expire on June 1, 2015. See, P.L. 109-160 
(extension until February 3, 2006); P.L. 109-177 (extension until December 31, 2009); P.L. 111-118, §1004 (2009) 
(extension until February 28, 2010); P.L. 111-141 (extension until February 28, 2011); P.L. 112-3 (extension until May 
27, 2011); P.L. 112-14 (extension until June 1, 2015). 
14 50 U.S.C. §1861(b)(2)(A). Records are considered presumptively relevant if they pertain to a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power; the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such authorized 
investigation; or an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of 
such authorized investigation. Additionally, if the records sought are “library circulation records, library patron lists, 
book sales records, book customer lists, firearms sales records, tax return records, educational records, or medical 
records containing information that would identify a person,” the application must be approved by one of three high-
ranking FBI officers, and cannot be further delegated.  
15 50 U.S.C. §1861(a)(2). 
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by commentators and lawmakers.16 In particular, it has been argued that the collection of 
telephony metadata in bulk is an “unreasonable search[]” prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.17 
Before discussing these claims, this report will first provide a brief summary of the program’s 
history and current status. 
Description of Telephony Metadata Program 
Generally, the telephony metadata program has operated by placing few limits on the 
government’s ability to collect and retain large amounts of domestic and international telephone 
records while imposing more stringent restrictions on the government’s capacity to search or 
make further use of the collected metadata. These restrictions are not explicitly required by the 
statutory text of Section 215. Instead, they are delineated as part of the orders the FISC issues 
pursuant to Section 215.  
The program collects “metadata”—a term used in this context to refer to data about a phone call, 
but not the audio contents of a phone conversation itself.18 Declassified FISC orders indicate that 
the data include the number that a call was dialed from; the number that a call was dialed to; and 
the date, time, and duration of the call.19 The data do not include cell site location information. 
Intelligence officials have committed to alerting Members of Congress before collecting that 
location information, suggesting they currently have the authority to do so.20 
The operation of this program has been altered significantly since its existence became widely 
known in June of 2013.21 Its current state of operations reflects changes to the program that were 
announced by President Obama on January 17, 2014.22 Although the President directed the 
Attorney General and the intelligence community to recommend alternatives to the collection and 
retention of such metadata by the government, the announced changes did not immediately affect 
the ability of the NSA to collect or retain telephone records under this program. However, the 
changes did place additional restrictions on the ability to search the dataset as discussed below. 
                                                 
16 See, Senators Ron Wyden, Mark Udall, Martin Heinrich, End the N.S.A. Dragnet, Now, N.Y. TIMES, November 25, 
2013; PCLOB Report, supra note 2. 
17 Jameel Jaffer, Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, July 31, 2013, available at https://www.aclu.org/
files/assets/testimony.sjc_.073113.final_.pdf. It has also been argued that the program is not consistent with the 
requirements of §215. Id. Because this report is limited to constitutional challenges, an evaluation of such arguments is 
beyond the scope of this report. 
18 In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 14-
01, at n.2 (FISA Ct. January 3, 2014). 
19 Id.  
20 James Clapper, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, letter to Senator Ron Wyden, July 26, 2013, 
available at http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-and-udall-important-surveillance-questions-
unanswered 
21 Glenn Greenwald, “NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily,” The Guardian, June 5, 
2013. 
22 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence, January 17, 2014, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence [hereinafter 
“January 17 Remarks”]. 
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Metadata Queries Require Reasonable Articulable Suspicion 
Telephone service providers that are served with orders issued under Section 215 are required to 
provide the NSA with telephony metadata pertaining to all domestic and international calls made 
on their networks, on an “ongoing daily” basis.23 As this data is received by NSA, it is placed in a 
database referred to as the “Collection Store.”24 The orders require metadata to be deleted no later 
than five years after they are initially collected.25 
The FISC orders under which the telephony metadata program has operated have generally 
permitted searching the database for a particular number only if it can be demonstrated that there 
are facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS) that the telephone number in 
question, referred to as the “seed,” is associated with one of the foreign intelligence targets 
referenced in the court order.26 These targets are most commonly described as international 
terrorist organizations, although those portions of the FISC orders have not been declassified.27 
As used in other contexts, RAS is a less stringent standard than the “probable cause” standard that 
is required to be satisfied for criminal search warrants or traditional electronic surveillance under 
FISA.28  
Although the RAS standard appears to have been a constant presence throughout the life of the 
program, the entity designated as responsible for making the RAS determination has varied over 
time. For most of the time between 2006 and 2014, a relatively small group of NSA personnel 
was charged with evaluating whether any particular query was supported by RAS.29 However, on 
January 17, 2014, President Obama announced that he was directing the Department of Justice to 
seek a modification to the program that would require RAS determinations to be approved by the 
FISC prior to performing a query, except in cases of emergencies.30 The FISC approved those 
modifications and assumed the RAS-determination role beginning on February 5, 2014.31 
                                                 
23 In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 14-
01, at 3 (FISA Ct. January 3, 2014). The orders last for 90 days and then must be renewed for the program to continue. 
Id. at 18. 
24 Id. at 11. 
25 Id. at 14. 
26 Id. at 7. 
27 January 17 Remarks, supra note 22 (stating that “metadata that can be queried if and when we have a reasonable 
suspicion that a particular number is linked to a terrorist organization.”). 
28 See U.S. v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003) (forced entry into premises during execution of search warrant is 
permissible if there are reasonable grounds to expect futility of knocking, or if circumstances support a reasonable 
suspicion of exigency when the officers arrive at the door). Courts have eschewed using bright line rules to determine 
whether “reasonable suspicion” is warranted, and have required an examination of the totality of the circumstances 
instead. See U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227 (1985) (an informant’s detailed statements implicating a third party in a 
bank robbery were sufficient to provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a law enforcement stop of that 
third party); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1968) (police officer’s observation of individual repeatedly walking 
back and forth in front of storefronts and peering inside store windows provided reasonable belief that individuals were 
armed and about to engage in criminal activity justifying stop and frisk). 
29 In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 14-
01, at 7 (FISA Ct. January 3, 2014). 
30 January 17 Remarks, supra note 22.  
31 In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 14-01 (FISA Ct. 
February 5, 2014). 
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This arrangement was not unprecedented. Over the course of approximately six months in 2009, 
the FISC required RAS determinations to be made by the FISC on a case-by-case basis after 
instances of NSA non-compliance with the FISC’s previous orders were discovered and reported 
to the FISC by the Department of Justice.32 This pre-approval requirement was subsequently 
lifted after the FISC was satisfied that sufficient changes had been made to correct the earlier 
compliance violations.33 
Scope of Query Results Is Measured in “Hops” 
Once a telephone number has been RAS-approved, it may be used as the seed of a query to the 
Collection Store. The response to such a query will include a list of all telephone numbers in the 
Collection Store that either called or were called by the seed. These telephone numbers are 
frequently referred to as representing the first “hop” away from the seed, because they include 
only telephone numbers with which the seed was in direct contact. However, the response to an 
RAS-approved query is not necessarily limited to first-hop results. After the program’s existence 
was made public during the summer of 2013, intelligence officials stated that responses to queries 
could include telephone numbers up to three hops away from the initial seed.34 However, since 
the President’s announcement on January 17, 2014, query results are limited to those telephone 
numbers that are within two hops of the initial seed.35 All of the results that are returned from a 
query of the Collection Store are placed in a second database known as the “Corporate Store.”36 
The FISC orders currently in effect do not require queries of the Corporate Store to satisfy the 
RAS standard.37  
Fourth Amendment Challenges to Telephony Metadata Program 
Upon public revelation of the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata program, several lawsuits were 
filed in federal district courts challenging the constitutionality of this program under the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition to publicly 
released FISC rulings on this issue,38 the two courts to have reached the merits of this Fourth 
Amendment question—the District Court for the Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y.) in 
American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper and the District Court for the District of Columbia in 
Klayman v. Obama—split on whether the bulk collection of telephone records constitutes a 
Fourth Amendment search.39 At bottom, these courts disagreed about the applicability of the 1979 
                                                 
32 In re Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 08-13, at 18-19 (FISA Ct. March 5, 2009). 
33 In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 09-
13, at 6-7 (September 3, 2009). 
34 PCLOB Report, supra note 2, at 31 (citing Declaration of Teresa H. Shea, Signals Intelligence Director, NSA, ACLU 
v. Clapper, No. 13-3994 at ¶ 24 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 1, 2013)); see also In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring 
the Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 14-01 at 3 (FISA Ct. February 5, 2014). 
35 January 17 Remarks, supra note 22. 
36 In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 14-
01, at 11 (FISA Ct. January 3, 2014). 
37 Id. 
38 In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-
109 (FISA Ct. August 29, 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-09-primary-order.pdf; 
In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-
158 (FISA Ct. October 18, 2013). 
39 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0881, 2013 WL 6598728 
(continued...) 
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case Smith v. Maryland to the current case and the persuasiveness of more recent Supreme Court 
discussions about the effect of new technologies and prolonged government surveillance on the 
privacy interests of Americans.40 
The Fourth Amendment provides that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]”41 
Central to the Fourth Amendment is determining whether the government has engaged in a 
“search,” which occurs “when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that 
society recognizes as reasonable.”42 Smith v. Maryland was the starting point for the FISC and the 
two district courts in determining whether accessing a telephone customer’s phone records is a 
Fourth Amendment search.  
In Smith, upon police request, the telephone company installed a pen register at its main office to 
determine whether Smith had called the victim of a recent robbery.43 A pen register is simply a 
device for recording the outgoing numbers dialed from a telephone and does not record the 
content of the call.44 The police had neither a warrant nor court order for installing this device. In 
a 5-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that Smith had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
telephone numbers he dialed, and, therefore, the installation of the pen register was not a Fourth 
Amendment search.45 The Court grounded its holding in the proposition that “a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”46 
Because Smith “voluntarily conveyed” the numbers he dialed to the company, he should have 
understood that the company would record that information as a matter of course.47 This theory 
that individuals lose privacy protections when they share information with a third party (whether 
a private entity or the government) or where information is generated as part of a communication 
or transaction with a third party, has come to be known as “third-party doctrine.”48 Its application 
pre-dates Smith to a line of cases holding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect individuals 
from statements made to another person, even if that person turns out to be a government agent or 
is equipped with an electronic listening device.49 In Hoffa v. United States, for example, the Court 
observed that the Fourth Amendment did not require the suppression of incriminating statements 
made by the defendant to a government informant while in a private hotel room.50 In addition to 
these undercover agent cases, the third-party doctrine has been applied in various other instances 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
(D.D.C. December 16, 2013). Neither the S.D.N.Y. nor D.D.C. courts addressed whether the metadata program 
exceeded the statutory authority granted by section 215’s “any tangible things” provision, as both courts found that 
Congress impliedly precluded claims brought by third parties who may have been the subject of surveillance, but 
instead granted this right solely to the recipients of these orders, i.e., the telephone service providers. Clapper, 959 F. 
Supp. 2d at 742; Klayman, 2013 WL 6598728, at *9. 
40 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); see generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
41 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
42 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001). 
43 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.  
44 See 18 U.S.C. §3127(3). 
45 Smith, 442 U.S. 745-46. 
46 Id. at 743-44. 
47 Id. at 744. 
48 United States v. Jones, 908 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211 (D.D.C. 2012). 
49 See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 748 (1952); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 430 (1963). 
50 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). 
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of government requests for transactional records from private companies.51 This theory has been 
applied to non-content data, such as the to/from address line in an email,52 but not to the content 
of communications, for example, the body of an email.53 
Before the courts issued their rulings in ACLU v. Clapper and Klayman, the FISC was the first 
court to analyze the NSA’s bulk metadata collection program under the Fourth Amendment. In 
conducting its review of one of the government’s applications under Section 215, the FISC held 
that the Fourth Amendment provided no impediment to the proposed collection as Smith 
“squarely controlled” the “production of telephone service provider metadata.”54 Noting that 
Fourth Amendment interests are analyzed on an individual, and not group, basis, the FISC 
explained that “where one individual does not have a Fourth Amendment interest, grouping 
together a large number of similarly-situated individuals cannot result in a Fourth Amendment 
interest springing into existence ex nihilo.”55  
In ACLU v. Clapper, Judge Pauley of the S.D.N.Y. agreed with the FISC that a constitutional 
analysis of Section 215 was controlled by Smith, that the collection of bulk records was not a 
search, and thus the NSA’s metadata collection program did not violate the Fourth Amendment.56 
Like the FISC, Judge Pauley reasoned that the “collection of breathtaking amounts of information 
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment does not transform that sweep into a Fourth Amendment 
search.”57 In its brief, the ACLU had argued that the bulk metadata collection amounted to the 
same type of privacy intrusion that led five Justices of the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Jones to suggest that long term location monitoring is a Fourth Amendment search.58 Judge 
Pauley rejected this argument, asserting that lower courts are bound to apply Smith unless it has 
been explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court itself.59 
In Klayman, Judge Leon from the D.C. District Court, however, was more receptive to the 
argument that the aggregation of telephone records can result in a Fourth Amendment search.60 
Judge Leon found that the bulk telephony metadata program was “so different from the simple 
pen register that Smith is of little value” in assessing whether the program resulted in a search.61 
Instead, the D.C. District Court judge found more persuasive the so-called mosaic theory 
expounded by the Supreme Court in two separate opinions in United States v. Jones.62 In Jones, 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (bank records); United States v. Starkweather, 972 F.2d 1347 
(9th Cir. 1992) (utility records). 
52 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2007). 
53 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (10th Cir. 2010). 
54 In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from 
[Redacted], No. BR 13-109, at 6 (FISA Ct. 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-09-
primary-order.pdf. 
55 Id. at 9. 
56 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 752. 
57 Id.  
58 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 27-28, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 
1:13-cv-03994 (S.D.N.Y. October 1, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
60._pls._memo_of_law_in_opp._to_defs._mot._to_dismiss_2013.10.01.pdf. 
59 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 752. 
60 Klayman, 2013 WL 6598728, at *18. 
61 Id. at *19. 
62 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). 
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the majority held that the physical attachment of a GPS device to an individual’s car and the 
subsequent monitoring of information collected by that device was a Fourth Amendment search.63 
In two separate concurring opinions, five justices opined that although short term government 
monitoring may not exceed a person’s expectation of privacy, longer term monitoring may do so, 
as aggregating information about a person can reflect a “wealth of detail,” or mosaic, about his 
“familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”64 Acknowledging that “what 
metadata is has not changed over time,” Judge Leon found that quantity of information collected 
and what that information can tell the government about people’s lives required the court to look 
beyond Smith for its Fourth Amendment analysis.65 Finding that this aggregation invaded a 
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the court held that a Fourth Amendment search had 
occurred. 
Finding that this metadata collection was a search, Judge Leon of the D.C. District Court then 
assessed whether that search was “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.66 Noting that 
searches must generally be accompanied by a warrant based upon probable cause, the court 
assessed whether the “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement might apply to the 
bulk metadata program, because, again, collection under Section 215 requires neither a warrant 
nor probable cause. The special needs exception applies “when special needs, beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement, make the warrant requirement and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable.”67 Some examples of special needs cases include suspicionless drug testing of high 
school students68 and railroad personnel,69 automobile checkpoints for illegal immigrants70 and 
drunk drivers,71 and the search of airplane,72 subway,73 and train passengers’ carry-on bags.74 In 
each, the government’s interest went beyond a general interest in law enforcement to broader 
governmental needs. Even where the government can claim a special need beyond ordinary law 
enforcement interests, a reviewing court must balance the privacy interests of the individual with 
the government’s interest to determine whether a warrant or individualized suspicion is 
required.75 In making this determination, a court must consider (1) “the nature of the privacy 
interest upon which the search [] at issue intrudes”; (2) “the character of the intrusion that is 
complained of”; and (3) “the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern, ... and the 
efficacy of this means for meeting it.”76 Judge Leon accepted that the plaintiffs had significant 
privacy interests in the aggregation of their telephone data and that the government’s interest in 
identifying unknown terrorists was of the “highest order.”77 Turning to the efficacy of the 
                                                 
63 Id. at 949. 
64 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Id. at 964 (Alito, J. concurring). 
65 Klayman, 2013 WL 6598728, at *21 
66 Id. at *22. 
67 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S 646, 653 (1995) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). 
68 Id. at 664-665. 
69 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989). 
70 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1976).  
71 Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
72 United States v. Edwards, 498 F. 2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974). 
73 MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 275 (2d. Cir. 2006). 
74 Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 87 (2d. Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.). 
75 Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664-66 (1989). 
76 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S at 656-60. 
77 Klayman, 2013 WL 6598728, at *23. 
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program, the court questioned whether the program has “actually stopped an imminent attack, or 
otherwise aided the Government in achieving any objective that was time sensitive in nature.”78 
Doubting the metadata program has significantly aided the government in conducting time-
sensitive terrorism investigations, and in light of the serious privacy intrusions found, the court 
concluded that the bulk metadata program was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.79  
Both Klayman and Clapper have been appealed to their respective courts of appeals. However, as 
discussed below, recent developments in the metadata program may alter future Fourth 
Amendment analyses of similar foreign intelligence gathering practices. 
Recent Developments 
A substantial number of bills have been introduced in the 113th Congress that would address in 
various ways the scope of requests for business records under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT 
ACT of 2001.80 Additionally, recent media reports indicate that the Administration is considering 
proposing further changes under which telephone companies would not provide any telephone 
call records to the NSA until an RAS determination had been approved by the FISC.81 On March 
25, 2014, the chairman and ranking member of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence introduced the FISA Transparency and Modernization Act, H.R. 4291, which would 
prohibit bulk collection of telephone, electronic communication, and certain other business 
records under FISA,82 but would create a new mechanism for the Attorney General and DNI to 
obtain telephone call records from providers after making an RAS determination subject to post-
hoc judicial review.83  
PRISM and Upstream Acquisition of Internet 
Communications 
Contemporaneously with the origination of the telephony metadata program in 2001, the NSA 
also began acquiring Internet-based communications of overseas targets without the use of a 
traditional law enforcement warrant or an electronic surveillance order under Title I of FISA.84 
                                                 
78 Id. at *24. 
79 Id.  
80 See, e.g., S. 1182; H.R. 2684; S. 1551; S. 1599; H.R. 3361; S. 1631 (reported favorably by the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence). This is not a comprehensive list of bills proposed in the 113th Congress that may have an 
effect on the telephony metadata program. 
81 Ellen Nakashima, White House pushes Congress to quickly pass changes to NSA surveillance program, WASH. POST, 
March 27, 2014; THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: The Administration’s Proposal for Ending the Section 215 Bulk 
Telephony Metadata Program, March 27, 2014, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/27/
fact-sheet-administration-s-proposal-ending-section-215-bulk-telephony-m. 
82 H.R. 4291, §§2-4. 
83 H.R. 4291, §11 (adding new FISA §503). 
84 Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency, Schubert v. Obama, No. 07-cv-0693-JSW 
at ¶ 32 (N.D. Cal. December 20, 2013) available at http://icontherecord.tumblr.com. 
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Ultimately, new statutory authority for this type of acquisition was provided, at first, temporarily 
under the Protect America Act (PAA) of 2007;85 and on a longer term basis by the FAA.86  
According to a partially declassified 2011 opinion from the FISC, NSA collected 250 million 
Internet communications per year under this program.87 Of these communications, 91% were 
acquired “directly from Internet Service Providers,” referred to as “PRISM collection.”88 The 
other 9% were acquired through what NSA calls “upstream collection,” meaning acquisition 
while Internet traffic is in transit from one unspecified location to another.89 NSA also has two 
methods for collecting information about a specific target: “to/from” communications collection, 
in which the target is the sender or receiver of the Internet communications; and “about” 
communications collection, in which the target is only mentioned in communications between 
non-targets.90 The Obama Administration also acknowledged to the FISC that technical 
limitations in the “upstream” collection result in the collection of some communications that are 
unrelated to the target or that may take place entirely between persons located in the United 
States.91 
The PRISM and upstream collections differ from the telephony metadata program in two key 
respects. First, the PRISM and upstream collections acquire the contents of those 
communications. Second, as this program targets the “to/from” and “about” communications of 
foreigners who are abroad, the collection of Internet-based communications may be considered 
by some to be more discriminating than the bulk collection of telephony metadata. 
Overview of Section 702 
Section 702 of FISA, as added by the FAA, permits the Attorney General (AG) and the DNI to 
jointly authorize targeting of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States.92 Once authorized, such acquisitions may last for periods of up to one year. Under 
Subsection 702(b) of FISA, such an acquisition is also subject to several limitations. Specifically, 
an acquisition 
• may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be 
located in the United States;  
• may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside 
the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, 
known person reasonably believed to be in the United States;  
• may not intentionally target a U.S. person reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States;  
                                                 
85 P.L. 110-55. 
86 P.L. 110-261. 
87 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Memorandum Opinion, at 29 (FISA Ct. October 3, 2011) (Bates, J.). 
88 Id. at 29-30. 
89 Id. at n.24. 
90 Id., at 15.  
91 Id. at 5, 29-33. 
92 50 U.S.C. §1881a. 
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• may not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender and all 
intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the 
United States; and 
• must be conducted in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.93  
Traditional FISA orders authorizing electronic surveillance generally require the FISC to find, 
inter alia, that probable cause exists to believe that the particular target of the proposed 
surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.94 In contrast, under Section 702, 
individual targets of surveillance are not necessarily reviewed by the FISC prior to acquisition of 
their communications. Instead, the FISC’s role is largely limited to reviewing the targeting and 
minimization95 procedures that the government proposes to use to target and acquire 
communications prospectively. In order to be approved, Section 702 requires the targeting 
procedures be reasonably designed to ensure that an acquisition is limited to targeting persons 
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States and to prevent the intentional 
acquisition of any communication where the sender and all intended recipients are known at the 
time of the acquisition to be located in the United States.96 The court must also find that the 
minimization procedures are reasonably designed to minimize the retention, and prohibit the 
dissemination, of information that is about a U.S. person or that could identify a U.S. person.97 
However, the minimization procedures may allow for the retention and dissemination of 
information, including U.S. person information, that is evidence of a crime.98 
Constitutional Challenges to Acquisition of Internet 
Communications 
Constitutional challenges to the NSA’s acquisition of Internet communications of overseas targets 
under FISA have arisen in a number of different contexts. First, such challenges have arisen in the 
FISC and FISCR as part of those courts’ roles in approving the parameters of these collection 
activities. Secondly, constitutional challenges have been brought in traditional federal courts as 
civil actions by plaintiffs asserting an injury or in criminal proceedings by defendants who have 
been notified that evidence against them was obtained or derived from collection under Section 
702.  
                                                 
93 50 U.S.C. §1881a(b). 
94 50 U.S.C. §1805(a)(2). As defined by FISA, the term “foreign power” includes international terrorist organizations. 
50 U.S.C. §1801(a)(4). 
95 Minimization procedures generally provide standards governing the circumstances under which particular 
communications may be acquired, used, and shared. 
96 50 U.S.C. §1881a(d) The certification must also attest that guidelines have been adopted to ensure that the 
specifically prohibited types of surveillance activities listed in §702(b), such as reverse targeting, are not conducted.  
97 50 U.S.C. §1881a(e). 
98 Id. 
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FISCR Protect America Act Litigation 
Prior to the enactment of Section 702, a similar joint authorization procedure created under the 
PAA was upheld by the FISCR in 2008.99 This suit arose out of the objection of an Internet 
service provider (ISP) to a directive the company had received ordering it to assist in surveillance 
activities under the PAA. Under a theory of third-party standing, the ISP was able to raise the 
Fourth Amendment privacy rights of its customers.100 Under Fourth Amendment case law, unless 
an exception applies, the government must obtain a warrant to conduct electronic surveillance, as 
this type of investigation invades an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.101 Although 
the Supreme Court has declined to address whether there is a foreign intelligence exception to the 
Fourth Amendment that would permit the executive to engage in warrantless electronic 
surveillance,102 the FISCR had previously suggested that such an exception applied to 
surveillance conducted under traditional FISA authorities.103  
When this question was presented to the FISCR in the context of the PAA, the court formally 
recognized a foreign intelligence exception based upon principles supporting the “special needs” 
exception that has been developed in other contexts.104 Generally, the special needs exception 
may excuse the warrant requirement when the purpose behind governmental action goes beyond 
routine law enforcement and insisting upon a warrant would materially interfere with the 
accomplishment of that purpose.105  
As applied to the joint authorization procedure in the PAA, the court found that the acquisition of 
foreign intelligence information went “well beyond garden-variety law enforcement” purposes.106 
Furthermore, the court found a high degree of probability that requiring a warrant would hinder 
the government’s ability to collect time-sensitive information and that this would impede the vital 
national security interests at stake.107  
Although no warrant was required by the Fourth Amendment, the court did hold that the Fourth 
Amendment still required the surveillance to be reasonable, based on the totality of the 
circumstances.108 Finding the government’s interest in national security to be of the highest order, 
the court held that protections contained in the PAA, in light of this very important government 
interest, reasonably offset the lack of particularity or prior judicial review of the authorized 
surveillance.109 
                                                 
99 In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1009-1016 
(FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (upholding similar joint authorization procedure under the Protect America Act in the face of a 
Fourth Amendment challenge brought by telecommunications provider). 
100 Id. at 1009. 
101 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (10th Cir. 2010). 
102 See United States v. United States District Court (Keith Case), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
103 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 721 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
104 The special needs exception is also discussed in the context of the telephone metadata program supra, at “Fourth 
Amendment Challenges to Telephony Metadata Program.” 
105 Vernonia, 515 U.S at 653, supra note 67. 
106 In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1011. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 1012. 
109 Id. at 1016. 
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2011 FISC Opinions 
In August 2013, the Obama Administration partially declassified several opinions of the FISC 
regarding collection activities under Section 702.110 The first of these opinions, dated October 3, 
2011, evaluated the targeting and minimization procedures proposed by the government to deal 
with new information regarding the scope of upstream collection. Specifically, the government 
had recently discovered that its upstream collection activities had acquired unrelated international 
communications as well as wholly domestic communications due to technological limitations.  
After being presented with this new information, the FISC found the proposed minimization 
procedures to be deficient on statutory111 and constitutional112 grounds. With respect to the 
statutory requirements, the FISC noted that the government’s proposed minimization procedures 
were focused “almost exclusively” on information that an analyst wished to use and not on the 
larger set of information that had been acquired. Consequently, communications that were known 
to be unrelated to a target, including those that were potentially wholly domestic, could be 
retained for up to five years so long as the government was not seeking to use that information. 
The court found that this had the effect of maximizing the retention of such information, and was 
not consistent with FISA’s mandate to minimize the retention of U.S. person information.113 
The FISC also held that the proposed minimization procedures did not satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment.114 Notably, it applied the same analysis used by the FISCR in the PAA litigation, but 
found that, under the facts before it, the balance required under the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness test did not favor the government, particularly in light of the statutory 
deficiencies.115 
Following the FISC’s determination that the Fourth Amendment had been violated, the 
government presented revised minimization procedures to the FISC, and the court approved those 
procedures on November 30, 2011.116 The revised minimization procedures addressed the court’s 
concerns by requiring the segregation of those communications most likely to involve unrelated 
or wholly domestic communications; requiring special handling and markings for those 
communications which could not be segregated; and reducing the retention period of upstream 
collection from five years to two.117 With these modifications, the court found that the balancing 
                                                 
110 See Office of the DNI, DNI Declassifies Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), August 21, 2013, available at http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
post/58944252298/dni-declassifies-intelligence-community-documents. 
111 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Memorandum Opinion, at 59-63, 67-80 (October 3, 2011). 
112 Id, at 67-79 (October 3, 2011). The FISC upheld the targeting provisions, even though the government 
acknowledged that its upstream collection activities were known to acquire some wholly domestic communications. 
The FISC found that this was not a violation of §702, since the government could not determine “at the time of 
acquisition” whether a particular communication was wholly domestic. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
Memorandum Opinion, at 46-47 (October 3, 2011). 
113 Id. at 59. 
114 Id. at 67-79. 
115 Id. at 68, 75-78. 
116 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Memorandum Opinion, at 11-15 (November 30, 2011). 
117 Id. at 7-11.  
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test required under the Fourth Amendment supported the conclusion that the search was 
constitutionally permissible.118 
Clapper v. Amnesty International119 
Upon enactment of Section 702, a number of non-profit organizations brought suit challenging 
the joint authorization procedure for surveillance of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be 
abroad. The suit centrally alleged that this authority violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 
against unreasonable searches. In order to establish legal standing to challenge Title VII, the 
plaintiffs had argued that the financial costs they incurred in order to avoid their fear of being 
subject to surveillance constituted a legally cognizable injury. However, on February 26, 2013, in 
Clapper v. Amnesty International, the United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had not 
suffered a sufficiently concrete injury to have legal standing to challenge Title VII.120 Specifically, 
the Court held that in order to obtain injunctive relief from a federal court a plaintiff must prove 
with “specific facts” that he had been injured or that his injury would be “certainly impending” 
because of the challenged action.121 The High Court reasoned that because the non-profit 
organizations could not prove with specificity that it was “certainly impending” that the United 
States would utilize Section 702 to intercept the plaintiffs’ conversations, the plaintiffs lacked 
standing to bring their case.122 Because the Court did not have jurisdiction to proceed to the 
merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, the Court did not decide the Fourth Amendment question.  
Criminal Defendants 
The litigation in Clapper, while preventing a facial challenge to Section 702 by a group of non-
profit organizations that allegedly worked with clients who could have been subject to 
surveillance done pursuant to Title VII, may have resulted in a new series of challenges to the 
FAA by certain criminal defendants. In October of 2012, during oral argument before the High 
Court in Clapper, the Solicitor General, in responding to a question posed by Justice Sotomayor, 
stated that the government was providing notice to criminal defendants that evidence derived 
from Section 702 surveillance would be used in the criminal case, allowing the defendant to 
challenge the lawfulness of that provision.123 The Solicitor General’s response appears to have 
been prompted by a provision in FISA requiring the government, whenever it “intends to enter 
into evidence or otherwise use or disclose ... any information obtained or derived from an 
electronic surveillance ... [done] pursuant to” FISA, to “notify the aggrieved person and the 
court” “that the Government intends to so disclose or use such information.”124 In turn, once a 
                                                 
118 Id. at 14-15. A third declassified order from September of 2012 addressed the question of what to do with the 
information that had been acquired through upstream collection prior to the October 2011 opinion. In this third opinion, 
the FISC acknowledged that the NSA had made a “corporate decision” to purge all data identified as originating from 
upstream collection before October 31, 2011 (the date that the revised minimization procedures went into effect). 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Memorandum Opinion, at 11-15 (September 2012). 
119 For a more in depth discussion of Clapper v. Amnesty International, see CRS Report R43107, Foreign Surveillance 
and the Future of Standing to Sue Post-Clapper , by Andrew Nolan. 
120 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
121 Id.at 1149, n.4.  
122 Id. at 1148 (“[R]espondents’ theory of standing, which relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities, does not 
satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending.”).  
123 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2012). 
124 50 U.S.C. §1806(c).  
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criminal defendant is provided with such a notification, the defendant has the opportunity to ask a 
court to suppress the evidence that was “unlawfully acquired.”125 While the Clapper Court 
dismissed the case on standing grounds, the Supreme Court did so in part relying on the fact that 
a criminal defendant could potentially have standing to challenge Section 702 because of the 
notification provision.126 In the wake of Clapper, the Solicitor General reportedly examined the 
Justice Department’s notification policy and discovered that the policy required telling criminal 
defendants that incriminating evidence was gathered pursuant to surveillance conducted under 
FISA, but did not specifically mention that the surveillance was conducted under Title VII.127 As 
a result of this discovery, the Department of Justice reportedly altered its disclosure policy,128 
resulting in the filing of at least 10 notifications to criminal defendants that the government 
intends to utilize inculpatory evidence that was obtained or derived pursuant to the authority 
provided under Section 702.129 In at least one case, a criminal defendant has responded to the 
government’s notification, utilizing FISA’s provision allowing the suppression of any evidence 
“unlawfully acquired” under statute, by challenging the constitutionality of Section 702.130 
Unlike the litigation in the FISA Courts over the constitutionality of the PAA and the FAA, the 
litigation resulting over the suppression of evidence derived from Section 702 authorities is not 
isolated to the Fourth Amendment issue. In addition to the question of whether Section 702 
violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, criminal 
litigation over Title VII also challenges whether Section 702 violates Article III of the 
Constitution.131 Article III of the Constitution vests the “judicial power” of the United States in 
the Supreme Court and any inferior courts established by Congress,132 including the FISC.133 The 
Constitution limits the exercise of the “judicial power” to the adjudication of “cases” or 
                                                 
125 Id.  
126 133 S. Ct. at 1154 (“[O]ur holding today by no means insulates §1881a from judicial review ... if the Government 
intends to use or disclose information obtained or derived from a §1881a acquisition in judicial or administrative 
proceedings, it must provide advance notice of its intent, and the affected person may challenge the lawfulness of the 
acquisition.”).  
127 See Charlie Savage, Federal Prosecutors, in a Policy Shift, Cite Warrantless Wiretaps as Evidence, N.Y. Times, 
October 26, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/us/federal-prosecutors-in-a-policy-shift-cite-
warrantless-wiretaps-as-evidence.html?hp&_r=0. 
128 Id.  
129 See Patrick C. Toomey, In Reversal, DOJ Poised to Give Notice of Warrantless Wiretapping, ACLU BLOG OF 
RIGHTS (October 18, 2013, 5:01 PM), available at https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/reversal-doj-poised-
give-notice-warrantless-wiretapping.  
130 See Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained or Derived from Surveillance Under the FISA Amendments 
Act and Motion for Discovery, United States v. Muhtorov, Case No. 12-CR-00033-JLK-1 (D. Colo. January 29, 2014).  
131 Id. at 44.  
132 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §1. 
133 Case law uniformly agrees that the FISA courts are courts established under Article III of the Constitution. See 
United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1987) (Kennedy, J.) (“[Appellant] ... appears to suggest that the 
FISA court is not properly constituted under [A]rticle III because the statute does not provide for life tenure on the 
FISA court. This argument has been raised in a number of cases and has been rejected by the courts. We reject it as 
well.”); In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (“The FISA court is wholly composed of United States 
District Court judges, who have been appointed for life by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and 
whose salaries cannot be reduced. The defendants’ contentions that because of their limited term on the FISA court, 
these judges lose their Article III status, has no merit.”); United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1197 (E.D.N.Y. 
1180) (same); United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1313 n.16 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (same); In re Release of Court 
Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 (FISA Ct. 2007) (“Notwithstanding the esoteric nature of its caseload, the FISC is 
an inferior federal court established under Article III.”). 
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“controversies,”134 and the case-or-controversy limitation has been the impetus of several rules of 
justiciability that restrict the court’s power and curb Congress’s ability to regulate federal 
courts.135 With respect to an Article III challenge to Section 702, relying on case law holding that 
the constitutional case-or-controversy requirement restricts a federal court to adjudicating live 
disputes that are “definite and concrete”136 and prevents an Article III court from issuing 
“advisory opinions,”137 critics of Section 702 argue that Title VII requires a federal court to 
“evaluat[e] in a vacuum” the legal propriety of the government’s targeting and minimization 
procedures without regard to how the government would be utilizing their FAA authorities in a 
specific surveillance action.138 Whether such an abstract assessment of the government’s 
surveillance procedures is a constitutionally appropriate role for a federal court may largely 
depend on how broadly Supreme Court decisions allowing Article III courts to “perform a variety 
of functions not necessarily or directly connected to adversarial proceedings in a trial or appellate 
court” is read.139 Moreover, while case law rejecting an Article III case-or-controversy challenge 
with respect to traditional FISA electronic surveillance orders did so because the ex parte review 
of a foreign surveillance application was viewed as presenting the court with “concrete questions” 
in a form that a judge was “capable of acting on,”140 it remains to be seen whether a court would 
find judicial review of the government’s targeting and minimization procedures under the FAA 
equally untroubling.141 To date, no federal court has ruled with respect to a suppression motion 
challenging the constitutionality of the FAA.  
 
                                                 
134 U.S. CONST. art. III, §2; see United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 641-42 (1950) (“Federal judicial power 
itself extends only to adjudication of cases and controversies.... ”). 
135 See generally CRS Report R43362, Reform of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts: Procedural and 
Operational Changes, by Andrew Nolan and Richard M. Thompson II, at pp. 6-9.  
136 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937). 
137 See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948). 
138 See Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained or Derived from Surveillance Under the FISA Amendments 
Act and Motion for Discovery, United States v. Muhtorov, Case No. 12-CR-00033-JLK-1, at *45 (D. Colo. January 29, 
2014).  
139 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 389 n.16 (1989).  
140 See United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1196 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (citing In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 567 
(1945)). 
141 There may be other arguments as to why §702 raises Article III questions. For example, pursuant to §702, if a 
certification filed in order to obtain foreign intelligence surveillance information is rejected by the FISC, the 
government can automatically continue the acquisition of such material pending an appeal to the FISCR, 50 U.S.C. 
§1881a(i)(4)(B), potentially calling into question whether Title VII allows the FISC to issue “dispositive” “final” 
judgments in line with Article III’s requirements. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995) (holding that 
the judicial power is “to render dispositive judgments”); but see Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 346-49 (2000) 
(upholding automatic stay provision in the Prison Litigation Reform Act against Article III challenge). For an extended 
discussion on whether automatic stays violates Article III, see CRS Report R43260, Reform of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Courts: Introducing a Public Advocate, by Andrew Nolan, Richard M. Thompson II, and Vivian S. Chu, 
at pp. 46-47. 
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